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JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h) and § 78-2a-4 confers jurisdiction over this appeal,
which is an appeal from an order entered by the Utah Court of Appeals.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's award of an
additional amount for alimony as each child of the Petitioner and Respondent reaches
majority and Petitioner's obligation to pay support for each child terminates.
Standards of Review: Alimony determinations are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Griffith v. Griffith, 985 P.2d 255 (Utah 1999); Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171
(Utah Ct. App. 2000). 'Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony
and property distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld on appeal unless a clear
and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated." Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209,
1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In exercising its discretion, however, the trial court must
make explicit findings of fact in support of its legal conclusions. Montoya v. Montoya,
696 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1985).
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES AND GROUNDS FOR SEEKING REVIEW
The issue was preserved during trial (see R. 304 (trial transcript at 178-79 and
193) and in a post-trial motion and memoranda in support of a motion for reconsideration
of the trial court's memorandum decision (see R. at 61; 64-65 and 83-85). Tax issues
were not raised because they did not become apparent until the Court of Appeals issued
its decision. It is a public policy matter that should be addressed by this Court.
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RELEVANT STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
§ 30-3-5(8), SUBSECTIONS (a), (c) and (g) (iV (if):
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor
spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor
spouse to attend school during the marriage.
UTAH CODE ANN.

* * * *

(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the
time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a).
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in
its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial.
* * * *

(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new
orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not
foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to
address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered,
unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
[Emphasis added]
UTAH CODE ANN,

g 78-45-2(6) AND (7):

(6) "Child" means:
(a) a son or daughter under the age of 18 years who is not otherwise emancipated,
self-supporting, married, or a member of the armed forces of the United States;
(b) a son or daughter over the age of 18 years, while enrolled in high school during the
normal and expected year of graduation and not otherwise emancipated, self-supporting,
married, or a member of the armed forces of the United States; or
(c) a son or daughter of any age who is incapacitated from earning a living and, if able
to provide some financial resources to the family, is not able to support self by own
means.
(7) "Child support" means a base child support award as defined in Section 78-45-2,
or a monthly financial award for uninsured medical expenses, ordered by a tribunal for
2

the support of a child, including current periodic payments, all arrearages which accrue
under an order for current periodic payments, and sum certain judgments awarded for
arrearages, medical expenses, and child care costs.
§ 78-45-3:
(1) Every father shall support his child and every child shall be presumed to be in
need of the support of his father. Every man shall support his wife when she is in need.
(2) Except as limited in a court order under Section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or 78-45-7.15:
(a) The expenses incurred on behalf of a minor child for reasonable and necessary
medical and dental expenses, and other necessities are chargeable upon the property of
both parents, regardless of the marital status of the parents.
(b) Either or both parents may be sued by a creditor for the expenses described in
Subsection (2)(a) incurred on behalf of minor children.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-45-4:
(1) Every woman shall support her child and every child shall be presumed to be in
need of the support of his mother. Every woman shall support her husband when he is in
need.
(2) Except as limited in a court order under Section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or 78-45-7.15:
(a) The expenses incurred on behalf of a minor child for reasonable and necessary
medical and dental expenses, and other necessities are chargeable upon the property of
both parents, regardless of the marital status of the parents.
(b) Either or both parents may be sued by a creditor for the expenses described in
Subsection (2)(a) incurred on behalf of minor children.
UTAH CODE ANN.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-3, SUBSECTIONS (l\(3) AND (4):
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to establish
an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of property in a
domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness
fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party to
prosecute or defend the action. The order may include provision for costs of the action.

(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to provide
money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance of
the other party and of any children in the custody of the other party.
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or judgment may
be amended during the course of the action or in the final order or judgment.
26 U.S.C.S. § 215 (A) AND (BV.
(a) General Rule. In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction
an amount equal to the alimony or separate maintenance payments paid during such
individual's taxable year.
3

(b) Alimony or separate maintenance payments defined. For purposes of this section,
the term "alimony or separate maintenance payment" means any alimony or separate
maintenance payment (as defined in section 71(b)) which is includible in the gross
income of the recipient under section 71.
26 U.S.C.S. g 7 1 ( A U B ) AND (C):
(a) General rule. Gross income includes amounts received as alimony or separate
maintenance payments.
(b) Alimony or separate maintenance payments defined. For purposes of this section—
(1) In general. The term "alimony or separate maintenance payment" means any
payment in cash if—
(A) such payment is received by (or on behalf of) a spouse under a divorce or
separation instrument,
(B) the divorce or separation instrument does not designate such payment as a
payment which is not includible in gross income under this section and not allowable as a
deduction under section 215,
(C) in the case of an individual legally separated from his spouse under a
decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, the payee spouse and the payor spouse are
not members of the same household at the time such payment is made, and
(D) there is no liability to make any such payment for any period after the
death of the payee spouse and there is no liability to make any payment (in cash or
property) as a substitute for such payments after the death of the payee spouse.
(2) Divorce or separation instrument. The term "divorce or separation instrument"
means—
(A) a decree of divorce or separate maintenance or a written instrument
incident to such a decree,
(B) a written separation agreement, or
(C) a decree (not described in subparagraph (A)) requiring a spouse to make
payments for the support or maintenance of the other spouse.
(c) Payments to support children.
(1) In general. Subsection (a) shall not apply to that part of any payment
which the terms of the divorce or separation instrument fix (in terms of an amount
of money or a part of the payment) as a sum which is payable for the support of
children of the payor spouse.
(2) Treatment of certain reductions related to contingencies involving child. For
purposes of paragraph (1), if any amount specified in the instrument will be reduced—
(A) on the happening of a contingency specified in the instrument relating to a
child (such as attaining a specified age, marrying, dying, leaving school, or a similar
contingency), or
(B) at a time which can clearly be associated with a contingency of a kind
specified in subparagraph (A), an amount equal to the amount of such reduction will be
treated as an amount fixed as payable for the support of children of the payor spouse.
4

(3) Special rule where payment is less than amount specified in instrument. For
purposes of this subsection, if any payment is less than the amount specified in the
instrument, then so much of such payment as does not exceed the sum payable for
support shall be considered a payment for such support.
[Emphasis added]
STATEMENT OF THE CASE, PROCEEDINGS, AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Summary On or about August 26, 2003, Kynda Kay Richardson petitioned for a
divorce from her husband, Kenneth Andrew Richardson, in the Third Judicial District
Court for Salt Lake County.

Among other things, Mrs. Richardson requested alimony

and child support.
Mrs. Richardson's custody of the parties' four minor children (Dana, Kyle, Avery,
and Justin) was not contested, and the trial court awarded Mrs. Richardson physical
custody. The trial court awarded $1,374 per month in child support to Mrs. Richardson,
with Mr. Richardson's obligations terminating with respect to each child, either upon the
child's eighteenth birthday or graduation from high school. The trial court ordered that
Mrs. Richardson was entitled to alimony of $420 per month. The trial court further
ordered that prospective increases in Mr. Richardson's alimony payments, in increments of
$100 per month, should be implemented each time one of the four minor children reaches
the age of eighteen.
On June 6, 2006, Mr. Richardson appealed the Decree and the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law raising two issues, (1) the award of retroactive alimony, and (2) the
prospective future increases in alimony.

5

On June 21, 2007, the Court of Appeals issued its decision, in which it affirmed the
decision of the trial court. See Memorandum of the Utah Court of Appeals provided in the
Addendum hereto.
Proceedings and Factual Background Mrs. Richardson filed her Petition for
Divorce on August 26, 2003. See R. at 1. A trial was held on February 8, 2005. After
hearing testimony and argument, the trial court took the issues under advisement. See R.
at 304 (trial transcript at 193).
During trial, Mrs. Richardson testified that the parties' two oldest children had lived
at home and attended college after reaching the age of eighteen, during which time the
parties had supported them. See R. at 304 (transcript at 31-33). On this basis, Mrs.
Richardson requested that the parties be required to treat the four minor children still
domiciled with her the same way. See id. (transcript at 33). Mrs. Richardson admitted,
however, that there was no verbal or written agreement with Mr. Richardson that the other
children would be treated the same way. See id. (transcript at 67- 68 (beginning lines 2325 of page 68; ending line 15 of page 68)).
The trial court issued a Memorandum Decision on June 3, 2005. In its
Memorandum Decision, the trial court determined that Mr. Richardson should pay $420
per month in alimony, for a term equal to the length of the marriage. See R. at 57. The
trial court further determined that
" . . . a good part of the income needed by Petitioner to maintain the
appropriate standard of living is also attributable to child support payments
from Respondent. * * * * . . . because the reasonable expenses associated
for a time even with older children will not necessarily diminish to zero as
they reach 18 years old and because some expenses . . . will not necessarily
6

be significantly or proportionately reduced
the court concludes
that it is reasonable to increase alimony to some extent as Kynda's income
from child support payments goes down and as Kenneth's expenses from
such payments also diminish."
See R. at 57. The trial court therefore determined that, as each of the parties' children
reaches the age of eighteen, the Mr. Richardson's alimony payments should increase by
$100 per month. See id.
On July 7, 2005, Mr. Richardson filed his Motion for Reconsideration with the trial
court. See R. at 61. After full briefing by both sides, the trial court granted the Motion for
Reconsideration in part, and denied it in part. See R. 103-117. The trial court did not alter
its decision with respect to prospective alimony increases, and reasoned that the increases
were not based on speculation, but rather, on circumstances foreseeable at the time of the
divorce. See R. at 106-107 and 207.
The trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and its Decree
in this matter on May 19, 2006. See R. 213 and 234. The trial court awarded $1,374 per
month in child support to Mrs. Richardson, with Mr. Richardson's child support
obligations scheduled to terminate with respect to each child upon the child's eighteenth
birthday or upon graduation from high school, if later. See R. at 235. The trial court
ordered Mr. Richardson to pay alimony to Mrs. Richardson in the amount of $420 per
month, with increases of $100 per month each time one of the four minor children reaches
the age of 18. See R. at 228-29 and 239 (explaining, at 228-229 that "reasonable expenses

associated for a time even with older children will not necessarily diminish to zero as they
reach eighteen

"). See R. at 229 and 240.

At the time of the Decree, the ages of the parties' minor children were as follows:
Dana, 19; Kyle, 17; Avery, 15; and Justin, 12. See R. at 234-35. The eighteenth birthdays
of the parties' minor children are as follows: May 17, 2005 (Dana); July 19, 2006 (Kyle);
August 21, 2008 (Avery); and March 25, 2011 (Justin). See R. at 214 (providing birth
dates). Dana presumably graduated from high school on or about June 4, 2005. See R. at
304 (transcript at 7). Kyle presumably graduated from high school in May, 2007. See R.
At 304 (transcript at 8). No testimony was presented with regard to Dana's, Kyle's,
Avery's or Justin's intentions to attend college, to remain at home, or to support
themselves after their eighteenth birthdays or after high school graduation.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
If the decision of the Court of Appeals is allowed to stand, it will set the precedent
that trial courts can force a parent to continue to financially support their adult children
through an award which is coined "alimony", but is in fact simply a continuation of child
support. Such precedent will allow a trial court to speculate as to the future positions of
the parties, rather than entering an order based on the evidence before the court.
Allowance of an alimony award such as that ordered by the trial court and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals will have inconsistent and confusing tax implications.

ARGUMENT
I.

The Court of Appeals Erred By Affirming An Order That Required Mr.
Richardson to Pay Increased Alimony as a Substitute for NonMandatory Child Support for Adult Children

The purpose of alimony is to provide support for the wife. See Medley v. Medley,
93 P.3d 847 at 848, n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (relying on Georgedes v. Georgedes, 627
P.2d 44, 46 (Utah 1981). An alimony award should enable the receiving spouse to
maintain, as nearly as possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Munns
v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah Ct.App.1990). In determining alimony, a trial court
must consider three factors: (1) the financial condition and needs of the receiving spouse,
(2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce sufficient income for him- or herself, and
(3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide support. Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d
1369, 1372 (Utah 1988); Haumont v. Haurnont, 793 P.2d 421, 423 (Utah Ct.App.1990);
Munns, 790 P.2d at 121.
Any future changes in alimony are limited to instances where a material change of
circumstances has occurred. See Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
(emphasis added). Howell also mandates that the "the standard of living existing at or
near the time of trial" is the appropriate benchmark for determining an alimony award.
See id. at 1212.
In the case at bar, the trial court abused its discretion by awarding automatic, future
increases in its alimony award in order to enable Mrs. Richardson to pay speculative
expenses related to the parties' adult children. See R. at 228-229 (explaining that
9

"reasonable expenses associated for a time even with older children will not necessarily
diminish to zero as they reach eighteen .. ..").
First, the automatic increases are not consonant with the goals of alimony. The trial
court did not order automatic increases only to support Mrs. Richardson. Instead, such
increases were awarded, at least in part, for expenses related to the parties' adult children.
The automatic alimony increases are, in effect, disguised and non-mandatory child support
payments.
As a matter of law, the Richardsons have no obligation to provide support to ablebodied, adult children. Under the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act (hereinafter,
"Support Act"), parents are not ordinarily obligated to provide any support to children over
the age of eighteen. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-1 through 78-45-13.
The Support Act does require parents to support their minor children. See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78-45-3 (father required to support child); 78-45-4 (mother required to
support child). The Support Act defines a "child," however, as a son or daughter who is
under the age of eighteen, unless the child is emancipated, married, or serving in the
armed forces. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-2(6)(a). The Support Act makes exceptions
for children who are over the age of eighteen, but still in high school during the normal,
expected year of graduation. The Act also includes exceptions for disabled children and
children who are otherwise unable to support themselves. See id. at subsection (b).
At the time of the decree in this case (May 19, 2006), only one of the parties'
children in question, Dana, had attained the age of eighteen. Dana was scheduled to
10

graduate from high school on or about June 4, 2006. See R. at 304 (transcript at 7, line
23). No findings were made, however, regarding Dana's ability to support herself after
graduation. Furthermore, no findings were made regarding the remaining three children's
ability to support themselves in the future, and any such findings would have been purely
speculative. As such, the trial court abused its discretion in mandating a $100 increases in
alimony when each child attains the age of eighteen.
Mrs. Richardson's justification for requesting alimony to compensate her for
expenses related to adult children was that the parties' two oldest children, Olivia and Ed,
had lived at home while attending college after they reached the age of eighteen, during
which time the parties supported Olivia and Ed. See R. at 304 (transcript at 31-33). Mrs.
Richardson admitted, however, that there was no verbal or written agreement with Mr.
Richardson that the four younger children would be treated the same way. See id.
(transcript at 67- 68 (beginning lines 23-25 of page 68; ending line 15 of page 68)). No
testimony was presented regarding which of the four younger children had been accepted
to college, intended to go to college, or intended to remain home after reaching age
eighteen.
As stated above, the payee spouse's standard of living existing at or near the time of
trial is the appropriate benchmark for determining an alimony award. See Howell v.
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Nevertheless, the trial court awarded
automatic increases in the alimony award each time one of the parties' children attains the
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age of eighteen. The court stated that it did this because it realized that Mrs. Richardson
was dependent on the child support to maintain her standard of living. The court said:
While a significant amount of [Mrs. Richardson's] expenses can now be
attributed to minor children in the home, a good part of the income needed
by [Mrs. Richardson] to maintain the appropriate standard of living is also
attributable to child support payments from [Mr. Richardson].
See R. at 229. This is an improper application of child support payments for two reasons.
First, the Court made no findings to explain its determination that $100.00 was calculated
to "maintain the appropriate standard of living." The $100.00 per child figure is an
arbitrary number that the trial court simply assigned without any calculation to support
such. Second, this Court has stated that "[c]ourt ordered child support is an obligation
imposed for the benefit of the children, not the divorcing spouse." Race v. Race, 740 P.2d
253, 256 (Utah, 1987). The premise that the child support helps maintain the lifestyle of
Mrs. Richardson and therefore, alimony should increase when the child support decreases
so that she can maintain the same standard of living is simply wrong. The child support is
for the children, not Mrs. Richardson. The natural consequence of this ruling is that, as a
matter of course, in all cases where there is an alimony and child support order, the court is
at liberty to increase alimony as children come of age. Such a position has not been
adopted by the courts in the past and should not be adopted at present.
The child support payments are for the support of the children. When the legal
obligation to make the payments ceases, the court should not order that they continue
under another name. As the court observed in Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So. 2d 853 (Fla.
1984), married parents may continue to support college-age children who remain at home,

but such support "may be conditional and may be withdrawn at any time, and no one may
bring an action to enforce continued payments. It would be fundamentally unfair for
courts to enforce these moral obligations of support only against divorced parents while
other parents may do as they choose." Grapin, 450 So. 2d at 854.
Moreover, the automatic alimony increases awarded in this case are for an
indefinite period of time. While it is true that parents often chose to continue supporting
adult children for some years after they attain the age of eighteen, most parents are
unwilling to do so indefinitely. As the award currently stands, Mr. Richardson has no
ability to petition the court to stop the increased alimony payments, barring unforeseen
circumstances. As long as Mrs. Richardson wishes to continue supporting adult children,
Mr. Richardson is obligated to support them regardless of how old they are. In effect,
Mrs. Richardson can hold him hostage to the decree, and she alone can decide when to
terminate non-mandatory child support (inappropriately labeled "alimony" by the trial
court).
II.

Under Utah Law, Automatic Changes in Alimony, Such As Ordered in
This Case, Are Disfavored

Under Utah law, alimony determinations must be based upon the payee spouse's
needs either at the time of separation or at the time of trial. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-35(8)(c). See also See Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 at 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Furthermore, "[t]he court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to
address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless
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the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action." See Utah Code Ann. §
30-3-5(8)(g)(ii).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that future changes in alimony are best left to
"future determinations by the court under its continuing jurisdiction." See MacLean v.
Maclean, 523 P.2d 862, at 863 (Utah 1974). Speculation about a party's future financial
situation is not an appropriate basis for mandating automatic adjustments to an award of
alimony. See Rasbandv. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 at 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (holding
that automatic decreases in an alimony award, based upon trial court's vague and
conclusory findings regarding wife's ability to earn future income, were improper). When
no evidence is adduced in support of an order containing periodic changes to alimony
payments, such periodic changes are an abuse of discretion. See Ridge v. Ridge, 542 P.2d
189 at 191 (Utah 1975) (holding that periodic reductions in alimony and ultimate
termination thereof was abuse of discretion because not based on the evidence at hearing,
which only showed husband's income had gone down by an amount certain).
In the context of petitions to modify, the Utah Court of Appeals has unequivocally
stated that "any future changes in alimony are limited to instances where a material
change of circumstances has occurred." See Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991) (emphasis added). Indeed, even a party's impending retirement is an
insufficient basis for a petition to modify. See Nelson v. Nelson, 97 P.3d 722, 723-24
(Utah Ct. App. 2004).
In Nelson, the court explained that petitioner's motion to terminate alimony, based
upon his scheduled, impending retirement and concomitant reduction in income, was not
14

ripe for decision because petitioner had not yet actually retired. According to the Nelson
decision, changes in alimony are not appropriate until an '"imminent clash of legal rights
and obligations'" has ripened. See Nelson, 97 P.3d at 723-24.
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion and misinterpreted relevant law by
requiring Mr. Richardson to pay larger alimony payments to Mrs. Richardson as each of
their four minor children reaches the age of eighteen. See R. at 228-229 (explaining that
"reasonable expenses associated for a time even with older children will not necessarily
diminish to zero as they reach eighteen . . . . " ) . These prospective increases are based on
speculation about Mrs. Richardson's potentially ongoing and, in all probability, nonmandatory costs associated with children who may or may not need support after they turn
eighteen. See R. at 304 (transcript at 31-33) (wherein Mrs. Richardson testified that
because the parties' had previously supported their two eldest children while they lived at
home and attended college, she expected that the same would apply to the four younger
children).
This case is analogous to Nelson, where the petitioner's retirement had not yet
occurred, and thus his retirement could not affect his obligation to pay alimony. Similarly,
in this case, three of the children had not reached the age of eighteen, and their future
ability to support themselves was unknown. It is also unknown whether or not Dana or the
other three children are or will be attending college or remaining in Mrs. Richardson's
home.
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Moreover, the parties have no obligation to support able-bodied children over the
age of eighteen in the absence of a contractual obligation. See Part I of this Appellant's
Brief, supra. Even if it is determined, in the future, that the parties have a statutory
obligation to support any of their adult children (for example, in the event of disability), it
would be a child support obligation and not a question of alimony.
Essentially, the trial court has engaged in speculation about what voluntary
expenditures the parties would make on behalf of their adult children in the future. That
is not the purpose of either alimony or child support. Alimony is meant to enable the
payee spouse to maintain her standard of living if she so chooses, or in the alternative, to
equalize the income of the parties. Alimony is not meant to compensate the payee spouse
for speculative, future expenditures on adult children that are wholly discretionary. The
payor spouse could just as easily, and most likely will, choose to make discretionary
expenditures on his adult children. If so, the payor spouse will also experience a potential
reduction in his discretionary income and his ability to pay alimony. Both parties should
be free to decide to what extent they wish to support able-bodied, adult children, free of
court interference.
Finally, to the extent that the alimony increases could be viewed as support for Mrs.
Richardson's standard of living, such increases are based upon speculation about the
future. It is unknown whether or not Mrs. Richardson's living expenses will remain
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constant. She might, for example, move into a less expensive residence as the children
move out. It is also unknown whether or not her earning capacity will increase.
Similarly, it is unknown if Mr. Richardson's earning capacity will remain constant.
His income could abruptly go down at or about the times of the court-ordered increases.
Further, his expenses could increase for a variety of reasons. For example, one of the
younger children could decide to live with him rather than with Mrs. Richardson. The trial
court abused its discretion by making assumptions about the parties' future expenses and
their ability to meet such expenses.
The order of the trial court was based solely on speculation of the trial judge. The
judge did not look at the facts as they were before him, but assumed that they would be a
certain way in the future. Such speculation undercuts the purpose of Utah Code Ann. §303-5(8)(g) which grants continuing jurisdiction so that the court may alter an alimony order
after circumstances have changed, not before.
III.

The precedent Set By the Court of Appeals Causes Confusing and
Inconsistent Tax Results.

The decree entered by the trial court causes inconsistent tax treatment. Under the
U.S. tax code "alimony" payments are deductible and "child support" payments are not. In
this case the trial judge has created unsure tax consequences because he has created
payments, which he calls "alimony", but which clearly fit under the tax code's definition
of "child support". The payments are to support the adult children.
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26 U.S.C.S. § 215(A) AND (B) and § 71(A)(B) AND (C)(2007), set forth the tax
treatment of alimony and child support. § 215 allows a tax deduction for the paying
spouse in the amount equal to alimony payments which are included in the gross income of
the receiving spouse under §71. § 71 states that alimony is included in the in the gross
income of the receiving spouse, but gross income shall not include "that part of any
payment which the terms of the divorce or separation instrument fix (in terms of an
amount of money or a part of the payment) as a sum which is payable for the support of
the children of the payor spouse." 26 U.S.C.S. §71(c)(1). The trial clearly stated that the
increase in alimony was in part to help support the adult children, or at the very least offset
money that Mrs. Richardson was using to support the adult children. Pursuant to §71 the
$100 increase per child in alimony would not be deductible by Mr. Richardson, nor would
it be included in Mrs. Richardson's gross income because it is specifically earmarked for
support of the children, even though the court calls it alimony.
After all the children reach eighteen, the alimony payments will have increased by
$4,800 per year. Two questions are raised: (1) how much of the $4,800, if any, is
deductible while Mrs. Richardson is supporting the adult children, and (2) will it ever be
proper to deduct the entire $4,800? At some point it is likely that Mrs. Richardson will
cease supporting the children, but the additional alimony payments will continue. Do the
parties include the $4,800 in Mrs. Richardson's income and allow Mr. Richardson the
deduction at that time, or do they gradually include the money in her income as the
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children become more and more self sufficient? How will Mr. Richardson know when
Mrs. Richardson is no longer supporting the children so that he may take tlle tax
deduction1* I hi
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questions unclear

because it improperly sets an "alimony" award to help support the children.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant Kenneth Richardson requests a rc\ t isal

I I In

Decree, insofar as it i i iai: iclates ii icreases in i alii i 101 ly as eacl i of tl le minor children reaches
the age of eighteen..

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^L

d

*y of December, 2007.

SCALLEY RLAD1NU BAFES
HANSEN & RASMUSSEN, P.C.

rTBruce Reading
Jonathan H. Rupp
Attorneys for Appellant

19

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I had delivered, postage prepaid, a true and exact copy of the
foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to the following party on the Z P
day of
December 2007:
Joseph Lee Nemelka
Attorney at Law
6806 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Scott L. Wiggins
Arnold & Wiggins, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
American Plaza II, Suite 105
57 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

J. Bruce Reading (2700)
Jonathan H. Rupp (11463)
SCALLEY READING BATES
HANSEN & RASMUSSEN, P.C.

Attorneys for Respondent
15 West South Temple, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7870
Facsimile: (801) 531-7968
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
• KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON,

Respondent / Appellee,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF
APPELLANT'S BR IFF

vs.
KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON,

Petitioner / Appellant,

Case No. 2007067S-SC
2006575-CA

1 hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of Appellant's Brief and placed the same in
the U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, first class mail, thiscxi day of December. 2007, directed to:
Joseph Lee Nemelka
Attorney at Law
6806 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Scott L. Wiggins
Arnold & Wiggins, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
American Plaza 11. Suite 105
57 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

A

QflMiL C\fc/ifo>

ADDENDUM
"A"

Decision of the Court of Appeals, Richardson
Richardson, 1007 UT App 222 (Utah Ct. App.
2007) (Not Selectedfor Official Publication)
(June 2 L 2007)

FILED
'I *\H APPELLATE COURTS
JUN2 12007
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
-00O00

Kynda Kay Richardson,
(N.

Petit loner and Appellee,
v

MEMORANDUM DECISION
^or Official Publication)
• ;::• No. 2 00 6 057 5 <'7»
F I L E D
(June 21, 2007)

Kenneth Andrew Richardson,
2007 UT App 222
Respondent and Appellant.

Third District, Salt Lake Department, 034905249
The Honorable Stephen L. Roth
Attorneys:' J. Bruce Reading and Willi a™ G, Wi lson, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant
Scott L. Wiggins, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judgeis'.Greenwood, '-Billings;- :and McHiigh.
BILLINGS•; • Judge t
Respondent Kenneth Andrew Richardson appeals the trial
court's alimony award, arguing that the trial court erred when it
ordered him to pay incremental increases in alimony to his exwife, Petitioner Kynda Kay Richardson, upon the termination of
child support. Mr. Richardson further asserts that the trial
court erred when it awarded Ms. Richardson retroactive alimony,
even though she failed to include a request for interim alimony
in her petition for divorce. "We review a trial court's award of
alimony for abuse of discretion.
'We will not disturb the trial
court's alimony award so long as the trial court exercises its
discretion within the standards set by the appellate courts,1'^
Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357,17, 80 P.3d 153
(citation omitted) (quoting Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 423 , 423
(Utah Ct. App. 1990)). We affirm.
First, Mr; Richardson contends that the trial court erred by
ordering that, as each of the parties' children turns eighteen
years old and the amount of child support decreases, the amount
of alimony Mr..Richardson pays Ms. Richardson increases.
Specifically, Mr. Richardson argues that it was improper for the
trial court to mandate future changes to Ms. Richardson's alimony
award based on a speculative change in her circumstances.

believe, however, that Mr. Richardson mischaracterizes the
considerations upon which the trial court based the increases in
alimony.
Under Utah law, fl[t]he trial court has broad latitude" in
determining alimony awards. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074
(Utah 1985). In making such awards, "the court shall consider
all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its
discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed
at the time of trial." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (c) (Supp.
2006). Moreover, "[t]he court may, under appropriate
circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties1 respective
standards of living." Id. § 30-3-5 (8) (d) . As the supreme court
stated, "the purpose of alimony . . . 'is to provide support for
the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of living she
enjoyed during marriage, and to prevent the wife from becoming a
public charge.1" Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075 (quoting English v.
English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977)).
Based on the underlying purpose of alimony, the supreme
court "articulated three factors that must be considered in
fixing a reasonable alimony award: ![1] the financial conditions
and needs of the wife; [2] the ability of the wife to produce a
sufficient income for herself; and [3] the ability of the husband
to provide support.1" Id. (quoting English, 565 P.!2d at.411-12).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that upon-Mr.
Richardson's motion to reconsider, the trial court properly
"analyzed the circumstances of the parties in light of these
three factors." Id.
It is clear that the trial court considered Ms. Richardson's
financial needs as well as her ability to support herself. The
trial court noted that
[t]he parties were married for over twenty
years and had six children. [Ms. Richardson]
gave up her ability to acquire significant
work skills and earning capacity to care for
a large family, and continued to care for the
remaining four minor children at the time of
trial. She is in her forties or fifties and
is not likely to significantly increase her
earning capacity to a point where she can
support herself at a standard the parties
enjoyed during the marriage.
This court has discussed the appropriateness of such alimony
considerations "after a long-term marriage, where the wife
(usually) has worked primarily in the home, has limited job
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skills, and is in her late forties or fifties." Howell v.
Howell, 8*06 P. 2d 1209, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1993 ).•
The trial court determined that Ms. Richardson's initial
alimony award of $420 per month was appropriate to address her
needs, but only because that amount was "based on [Ms.
Richardson's] present sources of income, including about $1375 in
child support, which will decrease incrementally as each of the
four minor children turns eighteen." Thus, as child support
payments decrease, so does that source of Ms, Richardson's
income. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court order
incrementally increasing Ms. Richardson's alimony award properly
considered her financial needs as well as her ability to support
herself.
The trial court also properly considered Mr. Richardson's
"ability . . . to provide support." Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075.
The trial court determined that while Mr. Richardson pays his
child support obligations, the parties' respective incomes are
equalized. However, as his child support obligations terminate
over time,, his ability to pay support to Ms. Richardson increases
while her ability to meet her own needs decreases. Without the
addition of incremental increases in alimony payments to Ms.
Richardson upon termination of child support, the parties' gross
monthly incomes would be significantly disproportionate, and she
would not be able- to enjoy the .standard of living she...enjoyed;
during the marriage.
After considering Mr. Richardson's ability to pay alimony
once his child support obligations decrease, the trial court
determined that upon the termination of his child support
payments, Mr. Richardson has an increased ability to provide Ms.
Richardson the support she needs to maintain the standard of
living she enjoyed during the marriage. These incremental
increases in alimony meet the goal of "better equaliz [ing] the
parties' abilities to go forward with their respective lives"
after their*long-term marriage, Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213, and
provide Ms. Richardson with "the [approximate] standard of living
she enjoyed during marriage," Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075
(Utah 1985) . Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding Ms. Richardson incremental
increases in alimony as her child support payments terminate.
Second, Mr. Richardson argues that the trial court erred
when it awarded Ms. Richardson retroactive alimony, even though
she never petitioned the court for interim alimony during the
divorce proceedings. Utah Code section 30-3-3 provides that the
trial court "may order a party to provide money, during the
pendency of the action, for the separate support and 'maintenance
of the other party." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(3) (Supp. 2006),
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Section 30-3-3 further indicates that interim alimony may be
ordered "prior to the entry of the final order or judgment [and]
may be amended during the course of the action or in the final
order or judgment." Id. § 30-3-3(4). This section allows a
trial court to award interim alimony and does not specifically
state that a party must request that the trial court order
interim alimony prior to entry of the final order. See id. § 303-3.
Here, Ms. Richardson did not separately request interim
alimony in her petition for divorce, but instead simply requested
alimony. However, she testified at trial that she was seeking
interim alimony. Section 30-3-5(1) gives the trial court power
to include "equitable orders" in divorce decrees, id. § 3 0-33(5), and the trial court has broad discretion in using this
power. See Curry v. Curry, 7 Utah 2d 198, 321 P.2d 939, 942
(Utah 1958) (recognizing that "the trial court is vested with
broad equitable powers in divorce matters and that its judgment
will not be disturbed lightly, nor at all unless the evidence
clearly preponderates against [its] findings, or there has been a
plain abuse of discretion, or a manifest injustice or inequity is
wrought"). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly
exercised its broad equitable powers in awarding retroactive
alimony to Ms. Richardson.
Accordingly/ we affirm.

Billings, Judge
Judged
Judith M. Billings,

WE CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Associate Presiding Judge

syne
Carolyn B. McHugh,
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RICHARDSON,KENNETH ANDREW

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KYNDA KAY R1 (liARDSON,

•]

Petitioner,

]

vs.
KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON,
Respondent.

])

Case No. 034905249 DA

]
)
]l

Judge Stephen L. Roth
Commissioner Susan Bradford

DECREE OF DIVORCE

The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable Stephen L. Roth of the aboveentitled Court on the 8th day of February, 2005. Petitioner appeared in person and was
represented by her counsel, Joseph Lee Nemelka. Respondent appeared in person and was
represented by his counsel, J. Bruce Reading. The Court, having heard argument of counsel and
testimony of the parties and witnesses, having reviewed the file in this matter, having taken the

matter under advisement, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, and having heretofore
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREE AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Petitioner is awarded a divorce from Respondent based on the existence of

irreconcilable differences that prevent the marriage from continuing.
2.

CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT: There were six children born to this

marriage, of whom four are still minors: Dana May Richardson, born May 17, 1987, Kyle Allen
Richardson, born July 19, 1988, Avery Keen Richardson, born August 21, 1990, and Justin
Wallace Richardson, born March 25, 1993. Petitioner is awarded sole physical and legal custody
of the minor children.
3.

Respondent shall pay child support to Petitioner in the sum of $1,374 per month

commencing as of the date of trial herein.
4.

Respondent's obligation to pay child support shall continue as to each minor child

until that minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school, whichever
later occurs.
5.

Pursuant to Utah Code §62A-11-401 et seq and -501, withholding of child support

from Respondent's wages as a means of collecting child support shall be authorized.
6.

INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS: Petitioner shall be awarded the minor children
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Dana and Justin as dependants for tax exemption purposes and Respondent shall be awarded the
minor children Kyle and Avery. When Dana reaches eighteen (18), the exemptions should
alternate to equalize the benefits as much as possible, with Respondent having the deductions for
two children and Petitioner for one the first year in which there are only three deductions
available, Petitioner having two and Respondent one in the second year, and so on. When the
deductions for children reduce to two, each parent may claim one deduction; when there is only
one deduction left, that deduction goes to Petitioner. In the alternative, for any tax year the party
for whom the exemption(s) is most valuable may elect to purchase the option(s) from the other
party for the amount the other party would lost if the exemption were not available. The parties
shall exchange tax information by March 1st of each year. In any event, Respondent's ability to
claim any minor child(ren) is conditioned upon his being current in his child support and medical
expense obligations.
7.

MEDICAL INSURANCE & EXPENSES: Each party shall provide medical

insurance for the minor children as long as it remains available at a reasonable cost through his or
her employment. If Respondent secures insurance, Respondent shall provide evidence of said
coverage and that such coverage is effective in Utah.
a.

Each parent shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium

actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance. The children's portion of the
premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid. The premium expense for the children
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shall be calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the
policy and multiplying the result by the number of children in the instant case
b

Each parent shall pay one-half QA) of all reasonable and necessary

uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the dependent
children
c

The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of

coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social
Security Act, 42 U S C Section 601 et seq , upon initial enrollment of the dependent children,
and thereafter on or before January 2 of each calendar year The parent shall notify the other
parent, or the Office of Recovery Services of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or
benefits within 30 calendar days of the date he/she knew or should have known of the change
d

The parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification

of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within thirty (30) days of
payment
e.

In addition to any other sanctions provided by the Court, a parent

incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to
recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with above
8

PERSONAL PROPERTY: During the marriage the parties acquired certain

^

items of personal property including a savings account containing about $1,000.00, a certificate of
deposit in the amount of approximately $6,000.00, a set of firearms collected by Respondent,
tools, certain items of apparel made of animal fur, a Bobcat tractor, and three vehicles: a van in
Petitioner's possession and two trucks (a 1981 Dodge Dakota and a 2003 Ford Ranger) in
Respondent's possession. Petitioner shall be awarded the savings account, the certificate of
deposit and the van and Respondent shall be awarded the two trucks, the tools, the firearm
collection, the Bobcat tractor, and the fur items.
9.

There is also a New York Life Insurance Policy on Respondent's life with a

$50,000.00 face amount and a cash value of about $6,300.00. It is in minor children's interest to
keep the insurance policy in place, with Respondent to pay the premiums, having the minor
children irrevocably designated as the beneficiaries and Petitioner as Trustee for the minor
children. Once the last child is emancipated, the policy is to cashed in, with Petitioner to receive
within sixty (60) days thereafter one-half Q/i) of the cash value of the policy, valued as of the time
of trial. The parties have the option, if they both agree to do so, of cashing the policy in now,
with the amount received in payment to be divided equally between them.
10.

Further, Respondent has a 401(k) that shall be divided equally and a Qualified

Domestic Relations Order shall be prepared, if necessary. Any loans taken out by Respondent
since the parties separation shall be added to the balance of the 401(k) prior to division.
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Respondent shall provide a copy of his most recent statement showing the current balance and
loan balance of the 401 (k).
11.

REAL PROPERTY: During the marriage the parties acquired two (2) parcels of

real property: the marital home in Eagle River, Alaska, near Anchorage, and an unimproved, .92
acre lot located in a subdivision in Willow, Alaska. Neither property is encumbered by a
mortgage or other significant lien. Respondent shall be awarded the Willow lot, but shall pay to
Petitioner the sum of $2,500.00 as her share of the Willow lot's value.
12.

The Eagle River residence shall be sold and the proceeds shall be split equally

between the parties. However, if Respondent wants to keep the house, he must pay $30,000.00
to Petitioner.
13.

ALIMONY: Petitioner is awarded the sum of $420.00 per month in alimony

from Respondent. The alimony payment due to Petitioner shall increase by $100.00 per month,
beginning the first day of the month after which each child turns eighteen (18). On this basis,
when the last child turns eighteen (18), the alimony increases to Petitioner will amount to an
additional $400.00 per month.
14.

Alimony shall continue for a period equal to the length of the marriage. Changes

in income due to retirement at a reasonable age are not taken into account here and may be
considered as changes of circumstances in the future, if otherwise appropriate. Alimony shall also

6

be paid retroactive to and including May, 2004. Said alimony obligation shall be automatically
withheld by the Office of Recovery Services.
15.

PARENT-TIME: Respondent shall successfully complete a parenting class that is

functionally equivalent to the multi-week parenting class provided by Valley Mental Health on
court referral. Further, such course shall administered by an agency approved by the State of
Alaska, such as the Men & Women's Center or the Recovery Connection. Once Respondent has
done this, parent-time shall begin pursuant to §30-3-37 of the Utah Code. Respondent must
complete the parenting course before the children are required to go to Alaska for parent-time. If
Respondent travels to Utah in the interim, even without first having completed the class, and upon
reasonable notice, he shall be allowed minimum parent-time pursuant to §30-3-35 of the Utah
Code, or as the parties may agree. Respondent shall also be given liberal telephone access to the
children at a minimum three (3) times per week, plus e-mail communication if available. The
parties shall contact Valley Mental Health (Kathy Reimherr-556-6037) to determine the nature of
its parenting class, and Respondent can complete that program or one in Alaska that is roughly
equivalent (for example, a multi-week parenting class approved by the Alaska counterpart to
Division of Child and Family Services). No later than thirty (30) days from December 23, 2005,
Respondent's counsel shall provide Petitioner's counsel with a description of the class he intends
to take. If the parties are in agreement that the proposed class meets the requirements of the
court, Respondent shall complete the class as soon as reasonably possible. If the parties are in
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disagreement, they shall approach the court for a resolution, but prepare to offer specific
alternatives. As soon as Respondent has provided written verification that he has successfully
completed the appropriate parenting class, his parent-time as set forth above can begin, including
travel to Alaska. All applicable provisions of the advisory guidelines set forth in §303-33 of the
Utah Code shall be adopted herein.
16.

Petitioner is ordered to pay the transportation costs of one (1) visit per year,

provided that (a) there is not only one (1) visit, and (b) arrangements are made at least thirty (30)
days in advance. If there is only one (1) visit per year, Petitioner shall be responsible for only onehalf (Vi) of the transportation costs for that visit.
17.

ATTORNEY'S FEES: Respondent shall be responsible to pay Petitioner's

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this matter in the sum of $4,488.00.
18.

NAME CHANGE:

DATED this p S l a v of

Petitioner shall be restored to her maiden name if desired
/ \Z^r(

/£.
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable Stephen L. Roth of the aboveentitled Court on the 8th day of February, 2005. Petitioner appeared in person and was
represented by her counsel, Joseph Lee Nemelka. Respondent appeared in person and was
represented by his counsel, J. Bruce Reading. The Court, having heard argument of counsel and
testimony of the parties and witnesses, having reviewed the file in this matter, having taken the
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matter under advisement, and being otherwise folly advised in the premises, hereby finds as
follows:
1.

JURISDICTION AND GROUNDS: As a threshold matter, the court notes that

Petitioner has lived in Salt Lake County since January, 2003, after the separation of the parties in
about mid-2002, and therefore concludes that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter of this case. Further, the parties have come to disagree deeply over crucial aspects of their
life together, perhaps most importantly over the approach to raising and disciplining their children.
While Respondent states that he does not desire a divorce, the parties had the benefit of
counseling before the filing of the Petition, have been separated for over two (2) years and have
established separate lives. The court concludes that there are grounds for entering a decree of
divorce based on the existence of irreconcilable differences that prevent the marriage from
continuing.
2.

CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT: There were six children born to this

marriage, of whom four are still minors: Dana May Richardson, born May 17, 1987, Kyle Allen
Richardson, born July 19, 1988, Avery Keen Richardson, born August 21, 1990, and Justin
Wallace Richardson, born March 25, 1993. The parties do not contest child custody and appear
to be in agreement with Petitioner should have sole physical and legal custody. Petitioner was the
primary caretaker for the children prior to the parties5 separation and the children continue to live
with her at their present home in West Valley City, Utah, while Kenneth has remained in Alaska,
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where the parties lived since their marriage in Anchorage on August 20, 1980. Petitioner appears
to strongly desire custody, and she has been and continues to be a fit parent. There is no
indication that the children have any different custody preference. The court concludes that
Petitioner is and has been a fit and proper parent, that there is not reason to disturb the parties'
own agreement with respect to custody.
3.

For purposes of the child support calculation, gross income includes income from

almost any source, other than those specifically excluded by the statute. See U.C. A., Section 7845-7.7(1). At the time of trial Respondent was working full time for Aurora Electric in
Anchorage as a project manager/estimator, earning a salary of $1,188.47 per week according to a
January 28, 2005, Employer Earnings Statement showing about $61,800.00 per year. Apparently
some time in 2003, after the parties' separation, Respondent was promoted to this supervisory
position from the journeyman electrician position that he had formerly held at Aurora Electric.
He received a lower salary in the prior position, but normally and consistently worked substantial
overtime (more than 40 hours per week) during the marriage and thus earned about $5,000.00
(2001 W-2) to $6,000.00 (2002 W-2) more each year than he does now, because as a supervisor,
overtime is no longer available to him. Respondent testified that he took the promotion because it
was a job change that he wanted and because his boss urged him to take the new position for the
benefit of the company. While there is no indication other than timing that Respondent took the
promotion in order to deliberately reduce his income for purposes of this proceeding, this was in
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significant part a voluntary decision on his part that reduced his income. For this reason, the
court believes that it is fair to consider his previous scrapping activities (in which he made up to
$1,000 per year from time to time) as a source of income still open to him and to consider his
historical overtime. In all, the court believes that it is reasonable to impute $1,700.00 per year a
reasonable assessment of Kenneth's additional earning capacity for purposes of child support and
alimony calculations, giving him some latitude to make changes in his work position to
accommodate reasonable work-related goals, while recognizing that those changes are largely
voluntary, as well as taking into account his ability to make additional income, as he has in the
past, from scrapping or other work.
4.

In addition, Respondent receives an annual distribution made to all citizens of the

State of Alaska. The most recent such distribution was $919, and Respondent testified that it was
sometimes less and sometimes more. The court finds that a reasonable estimate of Respondent's
income from state distributions is between $500 and $2,000, with the average bearing significantly
toward the higher figure, or about $1,500. This annual payment falls within the broad scope of
gross income under the statute, and the court concludes that the $1,500.00 figure is a reasonable
estimate of ongoing income from this source for purposes of calculating gross income (for child
support and alimony). Respondent's gross income for child support purposes is therefore
$61,800.00 plus $1,700.00 plus $1,500; a total of $65,000 per year, or $5,417.00 per month.
5.

Petitioner is employed by the State of Utah, working full time. Her last pay stub
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for 2004 showed her annual salary to be $21,927.00 or $1,827.00 per month. Petitioner's work
experience is relatively minimal because of the parties' decisions regarding how their family would
function during the marriage. After about a year of employment, Petitioner cared for the children
at home during the marriage, with only short periods of part time employment, and she does not
appear to have developed any specialized job skills. There was no evidence that she had either the
opportunity or the capacity to earn more than what she is making now; and the court concludes
that she is fully employed in her present position at the present rate of pay, which is her gross
income.
6.

There is no evidence that either party was obligated to any other person for

alimony or child support outside the bounds of this case, and therefore gross income and adjusted
gross income are the same for each party. These figures are therefore to be used for calculating
the share of child support attributable to each party, with Respondent to be the obligated party.
7.

Based upon the foregoing, Respondent shall pay child support to Petitioner in the

sum of $1,374 per month commencing as of the date of trial herein.
8.

Respondent's obligation to pay child support shall continue as to each minor child

until that minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school, whichever
later occurs.
9.

Pursuant to Utah Code §62A-11-401 et seq and -501, withholding of child support

from Respondent's wages as a means of collecting child support shall be authorized.
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10.

INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS: The parties propose that they should each be

allocated tax deductions for two children, but disagree on which. No real basis for allocation was
presented other than the representation that Petitioner needed at least one child deduction as
follows: Dana and Justin to Petitioner and Kyle and Avery to Respondent. When Dana reaches
eighteen (18), the exemptions should alternate to equalize the benefits as much as possible, with
Respondent having the deductions for two children and Petitioner for one the first year in which
there are only three deductions available, Petitioner having two and Respondent one in the second
year, and so on. When the deductions for children reduce to two, each parent may claim one
deduction; when there is only one deduction left, that deduction goes to Petitioner. In the
alternative, for any tax year the party for whom the exemption(s) is most valuable may elect to
purchase the option(s) from the other party for the amount the other party would lost if the
exemption were not available.
11.

MEDICAL INSURANCE & EXPENSES: Each party shall provide medical

insurance for the minor children as long as it remains available at a reasonable cost through his or
her employment. If Respondent secures insurance, Respondent shall provide evidence of said
coverage and that such coverage is effective in Utah.
a.

Each parent shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium

actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance. The children's portion of the
premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid. The premium expense for the children
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shall be calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the
policy and multiplying the result by the number of children in the instant case.
b.

Each parent shall pay one-half (14) of all reasonable and necessary

uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the dependent
children.
c.

The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of

coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial enrollment of the dependent children,
and thereafter on or before January 2 of each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other
parent, or the Office of Recovery Services of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or
benefits within 30 calendar days of the date he/she knew or should have known of the change.
d.

The parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification

of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within thirty (30) days of
payment.
e.

In addition to any other sanctions provided by the Court, a parent

incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to
recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with above.
12.

PERSONAL PROPERTY: The evidence at trial indicated disagreement over the
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value and division of the certain personal property acquired during the marriage. This involved
essentially a savings account containing about $1,000.00, a certificate of deposit in the amount of
approximately $6,000.00, a set of firearms collected by Respondent, tools, certain items of
apparel made of animal fur, a Bobcat tractor, and three vehicles: a van in Petitioner's possession
and two trucks (a 1981 Dodge Dakota and a 2003 Ford Ranger) in Respondent's possession.
The parties agreed at the end of the trial that Petitioner receive the savings account, the certificate
of deposit and the van and that Respondent be awarded the two trucks, the tools, the firearm
collection, the Bobcat tractor, and the fur items. The court has no reason to believe that this
division is not fair and equitable and therefore concludes that it is.
13.

There is also a New York Life Insurance Policy on Respondent's life with a

$50,000.00 face amount and a cash value of about $6,300.00. Respondent proposed that the
policy be cashed out and the proceeds be share equally between the parties. It was not clear to
the court what Petitioner wanted in this regard. It appears to the court that it would be of some
value to the parties and in the children's interest to keep the insurance policy in place, with
Respondent to pay the premiums, having the minor children irrevocably designated as the
beneficiaries and Petitioner as Trustee for the minor children. Once the last child is emancipated,
the policy is to cashed in, with Petitioner to receive within sixty (60) days thereafter one-half (Vi)
of the cash value of the policy, valued as of the time of trial. The parties have the option, if they
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both agree to do so, of cashing the policy in now, with the amount received in payment to be
divided equally between them.
14.

Further, Respondent has a 401(k) that shall be divided equally and a Qualified

Domestic Relations Order shall be prepared, if necessary. Any loans taken out by Respondent
since the parties separation shall be added to the balance of the 401(k) prior to division.
Respondent shall provide a copy of his most recent statement showing the current balance and
loan balance of the 401(k).
15.

REAL PROPERTY: There are two (2) parcels of real property at issue, the

marital home in Eagle River, Alaska, near Anchorage, and an unimproved, .92 acre lot located in
a subdivision in Willow, Alaska. Neither property is encumbered by a mortgage or other
significant lien. The parties agree that the equity of each property should be divided between
them, but they disagree about the value of each property. Petitioner believed the Willow lot to be
worth about $10,000.00, based on unspecified calls to real estate agents in the area. Respondent
estimated the lot to be worth $3,000.00 to $4,000.00 and said that it had an assessment value on
the tax notice of $4,200.00. The court believes that an estimated value of $5,000.00 is reasonable
approximation of the value of the lot, given the sparse information presented. Petitioner is to
receive $2,500.00 as her share of the Willow lot's value.
16.

The Eagle River home was purchased about twenty (20) years ago for about
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$50,000.00. It was appraised in early 2004 at $60,000.00. Respondent says the appraisal is
incorrect because it indicates that the house, a modular house, has sanitary sewer, asphalt street,
curb and gutter, which it does not have. He believes it is worth $47,000.00 based on a tax
assessment and on his estimate that it will take about $13,000.00 to connect the house to
municipal sewer, a step he says is necessary to make the house saleable. Petitioner says she
believes the appraisal is correct, even without a sewer hook-up, and that the house cannot have
depreciated in value since it was purchased. The appraisal indicates that property values in the
area are increasing, and no evidence was presented on how property tax assessments were made.
Respondent has presented no reliable evidence of the effect on property value of the lack of sewer
hook-up, much less that the value would be directly related to the cost of providing such an
improvement. Nor has he presented any evidence of how property tax assessments are made in
the area or how reliable an indication of actual value they are or that property values have
decreased since the purchase of the property for $50,000.00 over twenty (20) years ago. The
court believes that the appraisal is the most reliable indication of value under the circumstances
and finds that the house is worth $60,000.00 at the time of trial and the equity should be divided
equally, with the house to be sold and the net proceeds split equally between the parties. In the
alternative, if Respondent wants to keep the house, he must pay $30,000.00 to Petitioner.
17.

ALIMONY: "[T]he purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving spouse from
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becoming a public charge and to maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage to
the extent possible." Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991), citing Fletcher v
Fletcher, 615 P.2nd 1218, 1223 (Utah 1980). The Supreme Court, in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d
1072 (Utah 1985), set out "three factors that must be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony
award: [1] the financial conditions and needs of the wife; [2] the ability of the wife to produce a
sufficient income for herself; and [3] the ability of the husband to provide support." Id. At 1075
(edits by the court; citations omitted); U.C.A., Sect. 30-3-5(8) (which expands the number of
factors to be considered, while retaining the Jones factors as an essence of the inquiry.) After the
determination of the needs and resources of both parties using the Jones factors, "the court should
set alimony as permitted by those parameters, to approximate the parties' standard of living
during the marriage as closely as possible." Howell, 806 P.2d at 1212. In the case of a long-term
marriage, the alimony award "should, cto the extent possible, equalize the parties' respective
standards of living and maintain them at a level as close as possible to the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage.'" Id, quoting Gardner v Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah
1988) cf Howell, 806 P.2nd at 1216 n.4 ("The alimony award, however, need not be large
enough to maintain the receiving spouse at the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage if
that amount of alimony would lower the standard of living of the paying spouse below that of the
receiving spouse."). Having considered "all relevant facts and equitable principles," the court
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"may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial."
U.C.A., Section 30-3-5(8)(c).
18.

Petitioner's income, as discussed above, is $1,827.00 per month. Accepting the

annual deductions from her salary as set out in her 2004 year-end pay stub, they are Federal Tax
($465.10), Social Security Tax ($1,286.53), Medicare Tax ($300.88), State Tax $551.73), and
health, dental and vision insurance (together $1,176.52), for a total monthly deduction of about
$315.00. Her net income for alimony purposes is therefore $1,512.00. (The court is not
considering deductions for life insurance for either party because essentially voluntary (on the part
of Petitioner) or building cash value from this point forward (on the part of Respondent)). Child
support payments will be approximately $1,375.00 per month. Total net income, without
consideration of alimony tax consequences, is therefore about $2,897.00.
19.

As to general expense deductions, the court believes that Petitioner's monthly

expenses, as set forth in Exhibit 7, are reasonable, especially considering that she is caring for four
(4) children. Neither party presented much evidence of their standard of living at the time of
separation, so the court is relying primarily on evidence regarding their expenses as a fair
substitute or approximation. While she filed a financial declaration earlier that stated lower
expenses, the court found credible her explanation that she had been keeping expenses
deliberately low during that period because of the financial uncertainties of the unresolved divorce
and had increased her expenses to a more normal level during 2004, the subject period for Exhibit
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7. Those deductions are supported by detailed monthly expense reports. Nevertheless, Exhibit 7
contains more expenses that the court considers as either one-time costs or not allowable for
purposes of alimony determination. Those include attorneys fees and mediation costs related to
the divorce in the amount of $1,331.00. They also include $1,779.00 in what appears to be a onetime cost for the purchase of appliances ($906.10 to Maytag on January 26 and $873.05 to
Maytag on February 7), although the court believes that one-half that amount (about ($890.00) is
a reasonable annual budget for general maintenance of a home and its contents over a the long
term, given the number of children in her care and the need to furnish a separate house, and ought
to be included as an expense. Because the testimony indicated that the parties historically have
made donations to their church at about ten percent (10%) of income and continue to do so, each
listing such donations as part of their expenses, the court considers these donations as a
continuing part of their previous and present standard of living and will include them as
reasonable expenses for both parties. Deducting $185.00 per month for one-time expenses,
Petitioner's reasonable expenses are $3,306.00 per month. The deficit between her income,
including initial child support, and her reasonable expenses is therefore about $409.00 per month.
20.

Respondent's income, as discussed above, is $5,417.00 per month. This amounts

to salary of $61,800.00 per year, plus $1,500.00 state payment and $1,700.00 additional
attributed income, per the analysis set forth above. Deductions, per Respondent's weekly Direct
Deposit Earnings Statement, including Medicaid $16.94), Social Security ($72.45), Federal Tax
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$117.85), local tax $5.40) and health insurance $10.25). The court is not considering deductions
for 401k contributions, a medical flex plan and a 401k loan repayment. The loan payment
deduction (amounting to about $193.00 per month) is to pay off a $10,000.00 loan Respondent
took out of his retirement plan in 2003, after the separation, to pay attorneys fees $5,000.00, a
down payment on a new truck ($3,000.00), and a deposit in a savings account $2,000.00). The
court does not believe the repayment on this loan, given its timing and the use of the proceeds,
ought to be counted as a deduction from salary for alimony purposes. Other deductions appear
reasonable. Similarly, the medical flex plan is a voluntary contribution (about $10.00 per week)
that can be used to pay medical expenses as they arise (apparently deductibles and other expenses
not covered by insurance). Because this is essentially a medical savings plan for the benefit of the
Respondent, it should not be counted as a true deduction for alimony purposes.
21.

The total weekly deductions from salary are therefore about $223.00 or about

$966.00 per month. Including an additional $26.00 per month to account for a proportional
amount of deductions for the imputed $1,700.00 per year (there was no evidence that the state
payment of $1,982.00 per year was taxed), the total deductions are about $992.00 per month,
leaving a net income, before any alimony tax benefits of $4,465.00. There was no evidence of the
effect of alimony payments on Respondent's tax liability or alimony receipt on Petitioner's, but
the court does not believe that tax considerations related to alimony would substantially alter the
conclusions reached herein.
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22.

Some expenses the court believes should not be included. As discussed above, the

court does not believe that the expenses for repayment of the 401k loan (about $193.00 per
month) and life insurance (which the court estimates at $65.00 per moth based on the absence of
any other evidence other than Respondent's claim to have $165.00 in monthly expenses for all
insurance other than deducted health insurance premiums) should be included for purposes of
alimony determination, as they are not necessities, and neither party urged their inclusion. In
addition, Respondent claims a total of $350.00 per month in medical and dental expenses. There
was no evidence of a need for health care that would support expenses at that level, especially
since he apparently has employer-provided health insurance for which amounts are deducted from
his salary; and absent any evidence of particular health conditions requiring treatment, the court
believes that $50.00 per month is reasonable. Respondent's reasonable expenses are therefore
about $3,628.00.
23.

Respondent therefore has a surplus of net income over expenses of about $837.00

per month. The court notes that, while both the parties and the court have used figures for
income and expenses that appear quite specific, these figures in reality are approximations,
especially as they are meant to ultimately represent amounts received and spent in the future. In
determining alimony, the court recognizes and takes into account the imprecision of the amounts
involved.
24.

Other than the equity in the marital home, the parties have accumulated little in the
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way of resources to supplement their incomes. Considering Petitioner's financial condition and
needs and her inability to provide sufficient income to meet those needs, together with
Respondent's ability to provide support and the significant income differential between them even
taking into account the payment and receipt of child support, the court concludes that Respondent
shall pay alimony to Petitioner. In addition, the court believes it is significant that this is a long
term marriage in which Petitioner gave up her ability to improve her skills and earning capacity to
care for a large family, so that should play a part in the determination of alimony amounts, as well.
See Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213. The court believes that alimony in the amount of $420.00 is a fair
and reasonable award. This sum approximates the Petitioner's need, before consideration of the
alimony tax consequences, and falls within Respondent's capacity to pay, as determined by the
court.
25.

While a significant amount of her expenses can now be attributed to minor children

in the home, a good part of the income needed by Petitioner to maintain the appropriate standard
of living is also attributable to child support payments from Respondent. As children reach the
age of eighteen (18), which will be a regular occurrence over the next few years, the court
believes that Petitioner's income will be reduced disproportionately to the reduction of expenses
both because the reasonable expenses associated for a time even with older children will not
necessarily diminish to zero as they reach eighteen (18) years old and because expenses, such as
mortgage, utilities and so on will not necessarily be significantly or proportionately reduce even
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when children do leave the home. For that reason, the court concludes that it is reasonable to
increase alimony to some extent as Petitioner's income from child support payments goes down
and as Respondent's expenses from such payments also diminish. This also contributes to the
goal of maintaining a rough equivalence in the parties' standard of living after a long-term
marriage. Id. (considering the effects of diminishing child support obligations as children reach
eighteen (18) on the relative disparity of income between spouses). The alimony payments due to
Petitioner should therefore increase by $100.00 per month, beginning the first day of the month
after which each child turns eighteen (18). On this basis, when the last child turns eighteen (18),
Respondent's income will have increase by about $1,375.00 per month, while commensurate
alimony increases to Petitioner will amount to $400.00 per month, leaving him with some cushion
that takes into account the purported increased costs of living in Alaska and not reducing his
standard of living below Petitioner's.
26.

Alimony should continue for a period equal to the length of the marriage. Changes

in income due to retirement at a reasonable age are not taken into account here and may be
considered as changes of circumstances in the future, if otherwise appropriate. Alimony should be
paid retroactive to and including May, 2004.
27.

PARENT-TIME: While it is apparent that Respondent loves his children, during

the marriage he took a decidedly harsher approach to their discipline than did Petitioner, going to
the extreme of punishing them by the use of a belt on occasion and threatening to do so more
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regularly. The court believes that this goes beyond acceptable limits on discipline of children and
it apparently played a part in the break up of the marriage. The children remain somewhat
intimidated by their father, and their distance from him, both emotional and geographical at this
point, has been exacerbated by his decision that it would be best under the circumstances of the
separation to contact them infrequently. While his telephone contacts have recently increased, he
has seen the children only a few times since the separation. Some or all of the children have been
in counseling to deal in part with issues involving their father.
28.

It is in the best interest of the children to reestablish their relationship with their

father as soon as possible and that his access to them be as liberal as the distances involved allow,
at a minimum in accordance with the applicable guidelines for parent time. Under the
circumstances, Respondent shall successfully complete a parenting class that is functionally
equivalent to the multi-week parenting class provided by Valley Mental Health on court referral.
Further, such course shall administered by an agency approved by the State of Alaska, such as the
Men & Women's Center or the Recovery Connection. Once Respondent has done this, parenttime should begin pursuant to §30-3-37 of the Utah Code. The court's primary concern is that
Respondent complete the parenting course before the children are required to go to Alaska for
parent-time. If Respondent travels to Utah in the interim, even without first having completed the
class, and upon reasonable notice, he should be allowed minimum parent-time pursuant to §30-335 of the Utah Code or as the parties may agree. Respondent should also be given liberal
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telephone access to the children at a minimum three (3) times per week, plus e-mail
communication if available. The parties should contact Valley Mental Health (Kathy Reimherr556-6037) to determine the nature of its parenting class, and Respondent can complete that
program or one in Alaska that is roughly equivalent (for example, a multi-week parenting class
approved by the Alaska counterpart to Division of Child and Family Services). No later than
thirty (30) days from December 23, 2005, Respondent's counsel shall provide Petitioner's counsel
with a description of the class he intends to take. If the parties are in agreement that the proposed
class meets the requirements of the court, Respondent should complete the class as soon as
reasonably possible. If the parties are in disagreement, they should approach the court for a
resolution, but prepare to offer specific alternatives. As soon as Respondent has provided written
verification that he has successfully completed the appropriate parenting class, his parent-time as
set forth above can begin, including travel to Alaska. All applicable provisions of the advisory
guidelines set forth in §303-33 of the Utah Code shall be adopted herein.
29.

Petitioner is ordered to pay the transportation costs of one (1) visit per year,

provided that (a) there is not only one (1) visit, and (b) arrangements are made at least thirty (30)
days in advance. If there is only one (1) visit per year, Petitioner shall be responsible for only onehalf Q/i) of the transportation costs for that visit.
30.

ATTORNEY'S FEES: Based on the Court's assessment that Petitioner's
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expenses are beyond her income and other resources at this point and on its conclusions that
Respondent's resources provide him with a surplus over his expenses (as discussed in connection
with alimony, above), the court concludes that Respondent should be responsible to pay
Petitioner's reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this matter. Petitioner has insufficient income
to meet her needs, and alimony payments will bring her income up to the point where her needs
are met, not including attorney's fees. Respondent will have a level of surplus and is more able to
pay fees. Petitioner should provide evidence of the amount and reasonableness of the fees she
claims to the Court.
31.

NAME CHANGE:

Petitioner shall be restored to her maiden name if desired.

From the foregoing findings of facts, the Court now makes and enters its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the bonds of matrimony hereto and now existing between Petitioner and

Respondent shall be dissolved and Petitioner shall be granted decree of divorce from Respondent,
the same to become absolute and final upon the signing of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and the Decree of Divorce and the filing of the same with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court.
2.

That all matters and issues including, but not limited to, child custody, parent-time,

child support, alimony, division of property and debts, and attorney fees shall be ordered pursuant
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to the foregoing Findings of Fact.
Vi<
DATED this iV^day
of

_, 2006.
BY THE COURT:
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